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IN PRAISE OF FACTION: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS 
BENEFIT CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Jide Nzelibe 
ABSTRACT—Political factions are rarely treated as normatively desirable 
entities in constitutional or international law. On the contrary, they are 
either regarded as forces that thwart the general welfare or as sources of 
chronic political instability. Thus, the conventional wisdom often focuses 
on how to deploy institutional or legal structures that minimize the 
influence of faction. By contrast, this Essay argues that the institutions of 
constitutional and international law that are forged by self-interested 
factions can create significant side benefits for the rest of the society. At 
bottom, such institutions are likely to be more durable and energetic than 
those created by disinterested or high-minded social designers. Thus, rather 
than focus on trying to curtail the influence of faction in shaping political 
institutions, it may make more sense to broaden the scope of such influence 
to be as inclusive as possible.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 A bedrock assumption of democratic theorizing is that if one wants 
good and enduring constitutional and international institutions, one ought 
to suppress as much as possible the influence of self-interested factions.1 
This Essay suggests a contrary view. Take away the role of self-interested 
factions in institutional design and you risk being left with institutions that 
are unstable, weak, and lacking in energy. Across a wide swath of issue 
areas, from international trade to war powers, factions have played a 
beneficial role in designing and shaping relevant political institutions. At its 
core, this Essay argues that at least in some critical respects, we may want 
to encourage a greater—not lesser—role for self-interested factions in the 
design and maintenance of framework institutions of constitutional and 
international law. 
In many ways, the role assigned to factions in this account is rooted in 
a reverse Madisonian logic. According to Madison, our structure of 
separation of powers acts to diminish the role of factions by fueling 
institutional competition between the political branches in which “ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”2 By contrast, in the framework 
espoused here, institutional actors do not operate as a countervailing force 
against the influence of factions. Instead of being harnessed by other 
institutional actors, powerful factions will attempt to co-opt these diverse 
institutional actors to serve their narrow policy and electoral ambitions. But 
 
1 I use the terms “factions” and “special interest groups” interchangeably throughout this Essay. 
For a review of the literature on how constitutions may constrain rent seeking by interest groups, see 
Daniel Sutter, Constitutional Politics Within the Interest-Group Model, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 127 
(1995); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 
(1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 
(1984). The seminal work on this issue includes GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE 
REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985). 
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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here is the catch: those self-interested ambitions will often, though not 
always, overlap with what is socially beneficial for other groups in society. 
Overall, the thrust of this Essay’s argument is that we should view the 
private benefits that factions extract from pushing their preferred 
institutional arrangements as socially desirable. The possibility of obtaining 
private benefits may spur factions to create and maintain valuable political 
institutions. To be sure, sometimes the role of factional self-interest in 
institutional politics can become excessive and counterproductive. The 
solution should not be, however, to weaken or diminish the influence of 
factions, but instead to control their undesirable excesses through measures 
that discourage corruption and arbitrary governance. But having a system 
where rules are generally enforced “by the book” among major factions 
does not entail that those rules always have to be fair to all groups in 
society or enhance the general welfare. Indeed, in many instances, the rules 
may be skewed in favor of certain groups. This will often prove sufficient 
for long-term political stability, even if certain factions are favored, 
provided that the rules do not threaten the interests of the most powerful 
factions. 
The analysis here implies that the preoccupation with overcoming or 
managing faction has obscured a more fruitful approach to institutional 
design in constitutional and international law. There is no need to accept 
the notion that for constitutional democracy to flourish one needs efficient 
institutions that promote the interests of the majority of voters at the 
expense of narrow or minority factions. Similarly, international legal 
institutions need not produce outcomes that consistently advance the 
general welfare to be politically sustainable and enjoy widespread 
acceptance. From a normative perspective, what matters is not promoting 
the general welfare or weakening factions per se. It is instead to further 
some goals of institutions that may occasionally overlap with efficiency but 
albeit in an imperfect and somewhat unpredictable manner. One of those 
key goals includes institutional stability, and the route to that goal may 
often require that we accommodate the interests of powerful factions in a 
pragmatic and fair manner, and not oppose them. Indeed, a greater threat to 
democracy may arise when institutions evolve to threaten the fundamental 
preferences and interests of powerful political factions, especially when 
such institutions are perceived to produce policy effects that 
disproportionately benefit one side at the expense of another. 
Framed differently, the logic underpinning stable political institutions 
is not that they are structures that provide for general welfare; but instead, 
to borrow a phrase from Hirschman, they are structures of power that 
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reflect a compromise among warring factions who “recognize their mutual 
inability to achieve dominance.”3 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the fear of 
faction in debates in the institutional design literature. Even when theorists 
acknowledge that purging the influence of self-interested factions in 
institutional design will not always be feasible, it is often upheld as a 
regulative ideal to which institutional framers should aspire. 
Part II quibbles with the logic underpinning this assumption. It argues 
that, under the right conditions, self-interested factions do and should play 
a role in institutional design in both constitutional and international law. 
First, and most importantly, factions can help overcome some of the 
collective action problems that are likely to plague both the choice and 
maintenance of political institutions. Second, factions may invest 
significant resources in trying to promote the kinds of institutional 
arrangements under which they will likely secure private benefits. In doing 
so, they will often embrace institutional features that create spillover 
benefits for other unorganized groups. Thus, at the level of institutional 
choice, the crucial dynamic is not the one Mancur Olson feared—organized 
minority groups exploiting the unorganized majority—but rather, 
unorganized and passive groups and individuals free-riding off the efforts 
and investments of organized factions.4 Third, factions are likely to act as a 
countervailing force against the centralizing and collusive tendencies of 
power holders located in the various political branches and in international 
institutions. These benefits are illustrated through intense factional conflicts 
in United States history surrounding efforts to revise the constitutional 
structures that govern international trade and the allocation of war powers. 
This Part concludes by recognizing that while the focus of the paper has 
been on the upside of factions on institutional design, it is also the case that 
sometimes the influence of factions may not always be beneficial. In other 
words, there will often be tradeoffs between the energy and resources that 
factions may bring to the design of political institutions and the risks of 
corruption or wholesale capture of institutions by factions. But this Essay 
emphasizes the benign side of the tradeoff because it is one largely 
overlooked in much of the public law literature. 
This Essay then concludes. 
 
3 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 168 
(1991). 
4 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 53 (1971). 
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I. THE FEAR OF FACTION 
Much of public law discourse is obsessed with overcoming faction. 
Indeed, disquiet about the role and undue influence of political factions is 
as old as the American Republic itself.5 But while constitutional and 
democratic theory has been historically preoccupied with the dangers of 
majority factions,6 today’s theorists are more likely to be concerned about 
the influence of well-organized minority factions that supposedly run 
roughshod over the interests of the majority. Simply put, the feared specter 
of modern democracy is no longer that mass publics will impose their will 
on discrete minorities, but that minorities with concentrated interests will 
oppress majorities with diffuse interests. Mancur Olson undercut the 
optimistic vision of the pluralists of an earlier era who assumed that 
competition among interest groups would produce a desirable confluence 
of the preferences of all groups in society.7 Indeed, much of modern public 
choice theory emphasizes the disproportionate power that narrow groups 
exercise over public policy. For the most part, theorists assume that the 
power of minority groups will be deployed for counterproductive purposes. 
Constitutional and democratic theorists, who denounce the corrosive 
effects of narrow factions, are quick to point to a solution: fixing our 
constitutional structure and international institutions.8 And in an ironic 
twist of events, almost all the institutional actors that were originally 
supposed to check the tyranny of the majority are now being elicited to stop 
 
5 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55–56 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., New York, 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889) (“To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a 
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great 
object to which our inquiries are directed.”). 
6 See id. at 55 (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . 
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens.”); see also JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 2 (1985) (“Madison’s analysis 
in [The Federalist’s] essay No. 10 remains the foundation of American political theory on interest 
groups.”). 
7 See OLSON, supra note 4, at 53. For seminal examples of the optimist vision of the pluralist 
approach to factions, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23–24 (1967), and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: 
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (2d ed. 1971). 
8 The seminal account of using institutional design to correct the pathologies of public choice is 
from Brennan and Buchanan. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 2 (“If rules influence 
outcomes and if some outcomes are ‘better’ than others, it follows that to the extent that rules can be 
chosen, the study and analysis of comparative rules and institutions become proper objects of our 
attention.”). One version of this approach assumes that an institutional arrangement that has buy-in 
from a supermajority will best serve the general welfare. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. 
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 1–3 (2013) (arguing that interpreting the 
Constitution according to the original intent will be welfare-improving because it received the assent of 
a supermajority); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 23 (2010) (proposing institutional reforms that would help 
avoid capture of agencies by interest groups). 
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the onslaught of narrow minorities. Thus, independent courts, once 
heralded as beacons of hope for minority groups and the disenfranchised,9 
are being repackaged as institutional actors that can defend enfranchised 
majorities against the threat of special interests.10 Presidents, once 
considered aloof and removed from populist sentiments, are now venerated 
as a bulwark against the parochial factions that dominate the “broken 
branch” of Congress.11 Even independent bureaucrats—those faceless 
enemies of populism—have been enlisted in the cause to check the dangers 
of narrow factions.12 Finally, international law, often chastised for its 
democratic deficit,13 has also been brought into this picture. As one 
commentator argued in the context of international trade agreements, 
“[G]overnments risk to become prisoners of the ‘sirene-like’ pressures of 
organized interest groups unless they follow the wisdom of Ulysses . . . and 
tie their hands to the mast of international guarantees . . . .”14 
 
9 See Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving 
Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565, 1624 (2013) (“Minorities considered 
politically marginalized in the Vinson and Warren Courts era and equal partners in the political process 
in the Burger Court era came to be perceived as having too much political power in the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts era.”). 
10 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 375 (2009) (“The [Supreme] Court has to 
be attuned to aroused public opinion because it is the public that can save a Court in trouble with 
political leaders and likewise can motivate political leaders against it.”); Alon Cohen, Independent 
Judicial Review: A Blessing in Disguise, 37 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 209 (2014) (arguing that judicial 
review dissipates the power of special interest groups); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L REV. 
223, 267–68 (1986) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 86 (1985) (same). But cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary 
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (arguing that “an independent 
judiciary facilitates rather than, as conventionally believed, limits the practice of interest-group 
politics”). Other scholars have questioned whether there is any clear relationship between judicial 
independence and general welfare. See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social 
Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. 575, 609 (2014). 
11 See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 1217, 1226–30 (2006) (summarizing this view in the legal literature). For a more sanguine view 
of executive power as a check on congressional susceptibility to faction, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some 
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995). 
12 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (“[H]aving administrative agencies set government policy 
provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for deliberative decisionmaking 
informed by the values of the entire polity.”). 
13 See JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 10–21 (1998) (emphasizing the need for 
stronger constitutional safeguards in the creation of international commitments); John O. McGinnis & 
Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1233–46 (2007) 
(discussing the democratic deficit of certain kinds of international law, including customary 
international law). 
14 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 166 (1995); see also 
John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 511, 528–30 (2000) (describing the logic of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as benefitting 
all countries at the expense of special interest groups). 
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Many of these prescriptions appear to exploit certain realist aspects of 
political life, such as the belief that one can mobilize vice (or political self-
interest) in the service of virtue.15 In these models, however, the civilizing 
source of self-interested political behavior tends to run largely in one 
direction. In other words, the self-interests of power holders will tame the 
self-interests of factions, and not the other way around.16 Avarice or greed 
are the interests that presumably need to be checked, and an office holder’s 
quest for honor, prestige, and power does the checking.17 Of course, power-
seekers could check each other, such as when the courts and Congress are 
presumed to check the President.18 But the literature rarely considers the 
possibility that factions may in turn play a role in checking the excessive 
ambitions of office holders.19 At the most basic level, factions have become 
the undesired orphans of institutional design. 
 
15 One illustration of such an invisible hand argument is James Madison’s famous claim in The 
Federalist No. 51 that separation of powers will make “[a]mbition . . . counteract ambition.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 349 (James Madison). Madison’s argument has long been 
criticized for its opaqueness and lack of clarity. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches 
in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2001).  
16 A radical expression of the view that the pursuit of honor and ambition would ameliorate the 
habits of greed is put forth by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 72. In his defense of allowing the 
President more than one term in office, for instance, he argues:  
[I]f he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice his 
appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of approaching an 
inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, 
or his ambition. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 5, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton).  
17 Indeed, the political theorist, E. E. Schattschneider, thought that parties could serve to allay the 
pernicious influence of factions for this very reason. See E. E. Schattschneider, Pressure Groups Versus 
Political Parties, 259 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17, 17 (1948). For parties, he argued, 
“[t]he object is . . . to exercise the total power to govern and to assume general responsibility for the 
conduct of public business.” Id. Special interests, on the other hand, “do not attempt to get power by 
winning elections and are exempted, therefore, from the compulsions which determine the nature of 
party organization.” Id. 
18 Indeed, there is a vast contemporary literature on institutional reform that continues to rely on 
harnessing the self-interests of power seekers, such as courts or Congress, to correct excessive 
ambitions of other office seekers such as the President. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 185–207 
(1990) (suggesting elaborate legislative proposals to give Congress more bite in war powers). In 
addition to constitutionally recognized institutional players, some have also included a role for power-
seeking political parties or even broader constraints in the international system as a counteracting agent 
on other power seekers. See Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 
49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 51–53 (2013) (advocating the consideration of external constraints on the 
President’s foreign affairs authority); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2330–47 (2006) (parties as counterweight). But policy-seeking 
factions continue to be accorded little or no role. 
19 Ironically, this view is a complete inversion of the vision associated with Hobbes and other 
eighteenth century political theorists. For such theorists, it was the pursuit of honor and dignity that was 
considered more damaging to the public order, and he believed the more mundane passions would serve 
to counteract them. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 31 (1977). 
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Here is the rub: If political actors are susceptible to the influence of 
narrow factions during times of normal politics, how can we be sure they 
will not fall prey to the same forces when they are designing the institutions 
that establish the political rules of the game? After all, if political structures 
influence policy outcomes, then surely the same factions will seek to shape 
such political structures.20 Indeed, Jack Knight has suggested that political 
institutions are often “not best explained as a Pareto-superior response to 
collective goals or benefits but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts over 
distributional gains.”21 
But even as theorists acknowledge that purging the influence of self-
interested factions in institutional design will not always be feasible,22 it is 
often upheld as a regulative ideal to which institutional framers should 
aspire. Jon Elster has argued, for instance, that while there is no sure 
institutional path to the general welfare at the expense of faction, 
“constituent assemblies ought as far as possible to remove from their 
agenda issues on which interest has a purchase.”23 Otherwise, there is a risk 
that self-interested actors will exploit the occasion of institutional design to 
entrench themselves in power or lock in their preferred policy objectives. 
Against this view, some have argued that self-interested factions can 
provide the energy and motivation required to push through crucial 
policies.24 This Essay embraces this traditional justification for faction 
 
20 There is a growing literature on the contingency of political institutions. William H. Riker, 
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 432, 444–45 (1980) (“[I]nstitutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the product of 
social decisions.”); see also Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 261 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell 
eds., 2010) (discussing the role of power and self-interest in shaping institutions); Terry M. Moe, Power 
and Political Institutions, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 215 (2005) (same); Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: 
International Law as an Extension of Domestic Political Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 658–82 
(2011) (same). 
21 JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 19 (1992) (emphasis omitted).  
22 Although if factions resist having their interests or preferences ignored in institutional reform, 
then one runs into the problem in which the proposed reform runs contrary to the preferences of the 
likely reform agent. See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 636–40 (2006) (discussing this problem in institutional reform proposals). 
23 JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 235 (2013) 
(emphasis omitted). Other commentators have also expressed skepticism about the relationship between 
general welfare and institutional design. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 77 (2011) (“[T]here is no general welfarist argument for the separation of powers or 
checks and balances.”). 
24 Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 402 (2001) 
(“Veil rules not only dampen both information and bias; they also suppress decisionmakers’ activity. 
Removing the spur of self-interest threatens to reduce decisionmakers’ activity below acceptable levels, 
to the point where constitutional designers might plausibly prefer to lift the veil and spur more activity, 
even if the price is that some fraction of that increased activity is self-regarding.”). For a broader 
defense of the role of social conflict by pressure groups in advancing democracy, see MARTIN H. 
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during times of ordinary politics, but expands upon it by showing that it 
can also be supported by other normatively attractive justifications, even 
when the ostensible goal is designing framework institutions in 
constitutional and international law and not simply policymaking. 
II. FACTIONS MAY BENEFIT INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
When factions help shape political institutions, they can perform the 
following key functions: overcome collective action problems in the choice 
of institutions, create spillover benefits for unorganized groups, and help 
constrain the self-interested behavior of individual office holders. 
A. Overcoming Collective Action Problems  
The overarching point is a somewhat familiar one: Political 
institutions (such as those that empower and constrain public officials in 
constitutional or international law) are like any other sort of public good, 
and because of free-riding problems, there is a risk that they can be 
underproduced. After all, citizens will benefit from such institutions 
regardless as to whether they contribute towards establishing them in the 
first place. So they may likely shirk in contributing their fair share of 
energy and resources towards institutional design. But this free-riding 
tendency by citizens can thwart the provision of beneficial public 
institutions. In this scenario, we might be better off delegating some of the 
responsibility for both designing and maintaining political institutions to 
those who clearly have the motivation and resources to do so effectively, 
i.e., self-interested factions. Such factions may not only supply the relevant 
energy and resources for ushering their favored institutions through the 
political process, they also have incentives to alert the public and 
politicians of the costs and benefits of any institutional alternatives being 
considered. 
The force of this argument has been recognized in other contexts. 
Cowen et al. invoke it in explaining how groups seeking rents may further 
beneficial policy outcomes when officials are otherwise not sufficiently 
motivated.25 They argue, “Such institutions as pork-barrel politics can 
offset the selfishness of public sector participants, because they reward 
 
REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–10 (2013). 
25 Tyler Cowen et al., Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of Public Goods, 6 ECON. & POL. 
131, 140–41 (1994). There is also a significant political economy literature that suggests that interest 
groups competition can enhance the quality of public information. See David Austen-Smith & John R. 
Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25, 28 (1994); Richard Ball, Interest Groups, 
Influence and Welfare, 7 ECON. & POL. 119 (1995). 
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political effort.”26 Arguably, the self-interest of factions has even played an 
analogous role in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,27 
appealed to it explicitly in discussing the possible benefits of patronage 
hiring by state governments: 
Party strength requires the efforts of the rank and file, especially in “the dull 
periods between elections,” to perform such tasks as organizing precincts, 
registering new voters, and providing constituent services. Even the most 
enthusiastic supporter of a party’s program will shrink before such drudgery, 
and it is folly to think that ideological conviction alone will motivate 
sufficient numbers to keep the party going through the off years. “For the 
most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward generates a 
major portion of the local political activity supporting parties.”28 
One might argue that this analogy ought not to be extended to the 
choice of political institutions. With their overtones of exploitation and 
shortsightedness, factions hardly seem the ideal candidates for shouldering 
the burden of framing the political rules of the game that govern society. 
But there is another side to the story. Suppose some business group, 
seeking to extend the reach of foreign markets for its products, succeeds in 
pressing for a more open international trading regime? The consumers who 
benefit from the lower tariffs in such a free trade regime are not likely to 
fret much even if they were not consulted in its creation. Or suppose that 
some other faction, wary of being disproportionately burdened by high 
taxes for foreign military adventures, decides to support stronger 
constraints on war powers? If such constraints happen to block high-risk 
and dangerous military engagements, then we may prefer to retain them. 
What if in both instances the factions succeed in locking in their preferred 
institutional preferences without significant popular input? In either case it 
might be imprudent to reverse course simply because the relevant 
institutional choice was tainted by power and self-interest. Put differently, 
the implication of factional self-interest in institutional design need not 
involve a zero-sum dynamic; on the contrary, it might produce a reasonably 
decent state of affairs.29 
 
26 See Cowen et al., supra note 25, at 142. 
27 497 U.S. 62, 104 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Admittedly, Justice Scalia is referring to 
patronage benefits of political parties and not factions, but the broader point is that he alludes to the 
benefits the self-interests of groups create as a stabilizing force in modern political life. See id. 
28 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 385 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
29 Indeed, the fact of the matter is that in a whole range of circumstances the quest for private 
benefits can be congruent with public goods. For instance, when a middle-class family seeks increased 
investments in their local public school, they may simply be motivated to further their own children’s 
lifetime opportunities. Nonetheless, they may help produce a social benefit in the form of a more 
educated citizenry that inures to other members of society. 
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In the immediate post-Civil War period, for instance, northern 
Republican factions in the United States deployed their temporary and 
outsized political leverage to impose their institutional vision on the rest of 
the country. The end result—an almost complete restructuring of the 
previous constitutional order in favor of formerly disenfranchised African-
Americans—was accomplished without any input from a significant part of 
the country: the defeated South. As Tom Colby stated in a recent piece: 
The Fourteenth Amendment was a purely partisan measure . . . . [I]t would 
never have made it through Congress had all of the elected Senators and 
Representatives been permitted to vote. . . . [I]t was ratified not by the 
collective assent of the American people, but rather at gunpoint.30  
One may tend to think of the Reconstruction Amendments as historical 
anomalies, but there are a whole host of new institutional regimes that we 
merely accept because they happen to be.31 If such newly created regimes 
happen to suit our present needs, or at least do not actively undermine 
them, we may be content to let them persist. 
1. What of the Role of Popular Endorsement?.—Perhaps we care not 
only about whether a good institutional outcome happened to be chosen, 
but also whether a broad-based majority chose it for the right reasons. But 
why should we think that an unorganized majority would be motivated to 
mobilize and seek institutional change in the first place? Indeed, building 
on Olson’s insight about group size, one might argue that an institutional 
interest that is so broad that it covers every segment of society would be 
one too diffuse to mobilize.32 And while justifications of institutions that 
are rooted in social contract theories may continue to have some sway in 
popular discourse, they nonetheless remain unconvincing. It is very 
difficult, if not improbable, that individuals can come together and create 
an entire political order from agreement. As Hardin put it, “In a large 
society, we cannot simply see that we need government and then conclude 
by creating it. Self-love may block you and me from acting jointly with all 
our potential fellow citizens.”33 Of course, once institutional reform is put 
on the agenda, the voters (or their representatives) may vote up or down as 
to whether to adopt it either in a referendum or representative assembly, but 
the contours of such reform are likely to be shaped by others with more 
skin in the game. 
 
30 Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013).  
31 For illustrations of other such institutions, see infra Part II.A.2–B. 
32 See OLSON, supra note 4, at 53–55. 
33 Russell Hardin, From Power to Order, From Hobbes to Hume, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 69, 71 (1993). 
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Moreover, even when institutions are put in place with the best of 
intentions, they are susceptible to atrophy and neglect if they lack powerful 
constituencies willing to nourish them.34 For instance, Kindleberger argued, 
about the postwar global institutions, that the patronage of powerful states 
was indispensable to their survival.35 In the early days of the IMF, he 
observed, “[I]f the United States made no proposal, nothing happened.”36 
Another illustration of this dynamic comes from Kenya, where a well-
designed system for registering property eventually collapsed because the 
commercial interests that used to patronize it no longer found it useful.37 In 
that case, it was not that the registry no longer served a socially useful 
function, but that the special interest groups that normally invested 
resources in keeping it afloat lost the will to do so.38 And beyond collective 
action concerns, there are constraints on the ability of citizens to know 
which political institutions best serve their interests. Compared to policies, 
for instance, the benefits attainable by alternative political institutions, such 
as bicameralism, federalism, delegation to international institutions, or the 
separation of powers, are likely to be even more opaque and hard to 
understand to ordinary citizens.39 
To summarize, at the level of the choice of institutions, interests likely 
matter more than high-minded ideals. But will the institutional options 
favored by powerful factions come necessarily at the expense of every 
other group and produce socially wasteful outcomes? Or do collective 
action problems suggest that political institutions might be undersupplied, 
and hence the role of self-interested factions might help offset this 
deficiency? Because there is no widely agreed upon benchmark of an 
optimal level of political institutions, it is hard to answer these questions in 
any precise and definitive manner. The bigger challenge is to find an 
intermediate position between wholesale institutional cooption by factions 
and complete policy autonomy by institutional actors. 
 
34 See Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without International Government, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1986). 
35 See id. 
36 Id.  
37 See Ato Kwamena Onoma, The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of 
Land Documentation in Kenya, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND 
POWER 63 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010). 
38 See id. at 63–67.  
39 See William H. Riker, Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It 
Matter?, 2 COMP. POL. 135, 135–36 (1969) (discussing the gulf between the robust scholarly debates 
about federalism and relative public indifference).  
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In what follows, I will merely try to establish the plausibility that self-
interest can be a benign force for overcoming free riding problems by using 
an illustration from the founding era. 
2. An Illustration from the Philadelphia Convention.—Historically, 
efforts at centralizing political authority have sometimes been undertaken 
by factions with an eye towards reducing political transaction costs.40 
Under the rubric of saving costs, one might include not only the relative 
ease of concluding political bargains that facilitate commerce across many 
jurisdictions, but also the need to present a common front in foreign 
commercial policy. 
Bawn et al. have portrayed the Federalists that dominated the 
Philadelphia Convention agenda in 1787 as a strong and cohesive coalition 
composed primarily of southern planters and northern mercantilists.41 By 
demolishing the old order under the Articles of Confederation, these two 
factions were able to collude and set in place a structure that reduced the 
uncertainty and economic dislocation that resulted from having multiple 
states trying to regulate and tax cross border transactions.42 This new 
political order was, in Hardin’s words, designed “to increase the scale of 
the market in which entrepreneurs, farmers, and plantation owners in the 
states could trade.”43 To be sure, this arrangement did not benefit those 
factions that were not powerful enough to register their preferences in this 
grand bargain. As Hardin observes, “it wrecked the hopes of the Anti-
Federalist vision of small communities and independent farmers” in full 
control of their lives and their destinies.44 If so, then one has an instance of 
a factional initiative masquerading as populist democratic reform. 
The irony of the Convention is that its success required a political 
logic that flew in the face of Madison’s prescription in Federalist 10.45 It 
 
40 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 96 (1999) 
(“The point [of the 1787 Convention] was not to bargain for any trade in particular but to ease the way 
to such bargains by eliminating the wasteful transaction costs entailed in interstate tariffs.”). 
41 Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations 
in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 579–80 (2012). 
42 But cf. Robert A. McGuire & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political 
Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution, 19 AMER. ECON. REV. 219, 232 
(1989) (suggesting northern merchants were in general more likely to support the ratification of the 
Constitution, while southern slave owners were less likely to support ratification).  
43 HARDIN, supra note 40, at 95. 
44 Russell Hardin, Constitutional Economic Transition, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND 
DEMOCRATIC RULE 333 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001). 
45 Madison had argued that an extended republic would better restrain the power of large factions 
because it would make it harder for them to consolidate their strength. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
supra note 5, at 58 (James Madison) (”[T]he greater number of citizens and extent of territory which 
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required a national faction that was large and cohesive enough that it could 
foist its political will on others.46 But does that mean that this coalition 
made a choice that was bad for social welfare or harmful to other groups? 
Or was the coalition acting more like a dominant corporation that leverages 
its market power to impose industry-wide product standards, which then 
benefit other corporations as well? Alternatively, if one prefers the parlance 
of the realist school of international relations, was it acting like a global 
hegemon providing an international public good even when the hegemon’s 
motivations might be ostensibly selfish?47 After all, given the divide and 
rule policies of the United States’ main trading partners in Europe during 
the post-Revolution Era, it would seem that having a common tariff policy 
would have provided the young country much needed leverage if it wanted 
to negotiate favorable commercial terms. 
And to have a common tariff, it helps a great deal if one has a central 
authority that can establish and coordinate tariff policy. But this latter 
innovation does not imply that such a central authority will choose a 
socially beneficial tariff; on the contrary, it simply means that if and when 
a sufficiently powerful enough coalition emerges and wins office, the 
central authority can impose that coalition’s preferred tariffs. 
But the challenge with any form of institutional innovation is that it 
may unintentionally create or exacerbate other social conflicts down the 
road. And the Philadelphia experiment was no exception. For instance, as 
early as 1841, the German economist Friedrich List contended that a 
primary impetus for the Philadelphia Convention was an effort to protect 
American industry from the postwar flood of cheap English goods.48 But 
when, under the new Constitution, tariffs were eventually slashed in 1816, 
List accused Congress of being “[c]oerced . . . by powerful private interests 
 
may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government . . . renders factious 
combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter.”). 
46 Hardin justifies the stability of the post-Philadelphia constitutional order in similar terms: “[T]he 
US constitutional order may have come to work in part because one party gained hegemony for several 
decades. It might not have mattered very much whether the Hamiltonians or the Jeffersonians gained 
such hegemony. But it might have mattered whether neither had gained it . . . .” HARDIN, supra note 40, 
at 239. 
47 The proponents of hegemonic stability theory argue that a dominant country that gains 
disproportionately from an open market will have an incentive to secure and guarantee it for every other 
state. See, e.g., Kindleberger, supra note 34, at 8–9 (discussing how powerful states provide 
international public goods); see also Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International 
Trade, 18 WORLD POL. 317, 322–23 (1976) (arguing that a “hegemonic state will have a preference for 
an open structure” because openness “increases its aggregate national income” and “increases its 
political power”).  
48 FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 77–79 (Sampson S. Lloyd 
trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1909) (1841). 
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which were opposed to those of the manufacturers.”49 Because of the new 
low tariffs, he argued, “[The United States] suffered, for a second time, 
greater evils through peace than the most devastating war could have 
brought upon it.”50 List’s ruminations illuminate the extent to which 
antifaction rhetoric has been deployed in pursuit of a wide range of 
purposes in American history. In this case, List used it to impugn the 
motives of groups seeking free trade. But that does not imply that the 
protectionist motivations he ascribed to the framing generation were 
without foundation. Indeed, he himself points to concrete instances where 
such sentiments were expressed during that period.51 
List’s musings foreshadowed a new fault line of social conflict. The 
apparent consensus over the need to centralize tariff-making authority in 
1787 proved to be somewhat temporary. Sharp disagreements about the 
scope of tariff-making authority erupted during the antebellum era.52 At the 
heart of these disagreements was a rupture between the two dominant 
groups that constituted the long coalition in Philadelphia: Southern farmers 
and Northern mercantilists. Northern mercantilists embraced the view that 
a tariff could be used to protect infant industries, but export-oriented 
Southern farmers vehemently opposed this interpretation and thought it 
could only be used for revenue purposes.53 When the infamous Tariffs of 
Abomination passed in 1828, it eventually spurred the South Carolina 
Nullification Crisis of 1832.54 
The institutional politics of the Nullification Crisis defy the 
conventional wisdom about the relationship between constitutional 
structure and social welfare. The customary wisdom suggests that 
institutional structures that encompass bigger geographical entities will be 
less prone to protectionism than local or more decentralized structures.55 
 
49 Id. at 79. 
50 Id. at 80. 
51 Id. at 79. 
52 See JONATHAN J. PINCUS, PRESSURE GROUPS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM TARIFFS 15–47 
(1977); BRIAN D. SCHOEN, THE FRAGILE FABRIC OF UNION: COTTON, FEDERAL POLITICS, AND THE 
GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR 100–26 (2009).  
53 See SCHOEN, supra note 52, at 140–41 (describing the view of many delegates from the Lower 
South during the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention of 1831 that the protective tariffs were 
unconstitutional); see also WILLIAM S. BELKO, THE TRIUMPH OF THE ANTEBELLUM FREE TRADE 
MOVEMENT 32–34 (2012). 
54 For a background of this controversy and how it helped set the stage for the civil war, see 
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1816–1836 (1966).  
55 See, e.g., I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 32–33, 205–06 (4th ed. 2005) (observing 
that presidents favored low tariffs because the President’s constituency is national while that of a 
member of Congress is local); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 155–57 (2009) (same); 
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE 
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But for John C. Calhoun, the intellectual architect of nullification, it was 
the preferences of local jurisdictions in the South that would safeguard free 
trade against the rampant and welfare destroying protectionism of the 
central government.56 Calhoun further understood that courts might not 
have the capacity or will to distinguish between a constitutionally 
permissible revenue tariff and an impermissible protective one,57 but that 
export-oriented states like South Carolina—states that were harmed by the 
protectionist tariffs—would.58 
The memory of this calamitous event might explain why the framers 
of the Confederacy rejected the 1787 Constitution as a model for their own 
legislature’s tariff powers. Notably, Article I, Section 8 of the Confederate 
Constitution included this important qualification: “[N]or shall any duties 
or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster 
any branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be 
uniform throughout the Confederate States.”59 
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 exemplifies an instance where 
disagreement about narrow economic interests was strategically elevated to 
a fundamental contest over the identity and honor of a region. The export 
value of cotton grew dramatically during the decades before the crisis, and 
thus the divergence of commercial interests between the agrarian South and 
the industrial Northeast was magnified.60 Both sides took a principled stand 
in excess of what was at stake in the controversy, namely the reduction or 
the elimination of the 1828 Tariffs of Abomination. Of course, Calhoun 
and his political allies might have gambled that raising the stakes was the 
only political ammunition left for South Carolina to evade the harms of the 
detested policy. Indeed, after all the posturing, South Carolina immediately 
 
ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS 127–28 (1935) (same); Karen E. Schnietz, The Institutional 
Foundation of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act, 12 J. POL. HIST. 417, 429, 432 (2000) (same). 
56 See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 156–57 (describing Calhoun’s role in the Nullification Crisis). 
57 JOHN C. CALHOUN, Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION 
AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 313, 314 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) 
(“The courts cannot look in the motives of legislators. They are obliged to take acts by their titles and 
professed objects, and if these be Constitutional, [courts] cannot interpose their power, however grossly 
the acts may, in reality, violate the Constitution.”). 
58 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA UPON THE SUBJECT OF 
NULLIFICATION 15 (Boston, Beals, Homer & Co. 1832) (“[A]s the power to regulate commerce, 
conferred expressly for its security, cannot be fairly exerted for its destruction, so neither can it be 
perverted to the purpose of building up manufacturing establishments—an object entirely beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government.”). Indeed, the key pronullification faction in South Carolina 
was called the “States Rights and Free Trade Association.” See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 224. 
59 CONFEDERATE CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
60 See SCHOEN, supra note 52, at 102–07. 
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overturned the statute once the tariffs were reduced.61 One might hope that, 
given the intensity of the preferences of the pro-free trade coalitions in 
South Carolina, there might have been ways to accommodate these 
preferences outside the tactics adopted in 1832. Extreme political 
brinkmanship certainly has its merits, but one hopes that it is only resorted 
to when the stakes at issue are much more fundamental, and not simply the 
kind of economic injuries that could be addressed by tweaking tariff 
schedules. 
In the end, the two dominant coalitions that descended on Philadelphia 
in 1787 largely achieved their purpose in forging a new political order. The 
institutional arrangement they put in place demolished the existing state 
barriers to interstate trade and helped centralize foreign trade authority in a 
national government.62 This new regime succeeded in thwarting some of 
the most destructive commercial policies among the states under the old 
order despite the fact that it was a bargain by factions.63 Thus, one cannot 
assume that factions will tend to lobby for political institutions that will 
harm the general welfare; on the contrary, they may spur the creation of 
beneficial political institutions. But the Philadelphia experiment did not 
take place without any glitches. For instance, the details of how the 
national government would deploy its foreign trade authority were never 
ironed out completely during the Convention. To be sure, the new 
Constitution did not mandate the erection of new international trade 
barriers to protect domestic industries. But by centralizing the tariff power 
in the central government it made it easier to do so. And when protectionist 
tariffs were subsequently established in the early years after the 
Constitution was ratified, they provoked a strong reaction from Southern 
farmers who were so dependent on free trade. The Nullification Crisis that 
ensued in 1832 tested the limits of the Philadelphia bargain, but it by no 
means undermined it. Ultimately, none of the relevant factions at 
loggerheads during the Nullification Crisis concluded that it was worth 
reverting back to the pre-1787 order. 
B. Generating Spillover Benefits for Other Groups 
Assuming that factions are self-interested and seek institutions to 
provide them with private goods, might they generate spillover benefits for 
other groups in society? The distributional approach to institutions may not 
 
61 See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 293–97. 
62 See HARDIN, supra note 40, at 241–42; Bawn et al., supra note 41, at 579–980. 
63 See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 40, at 242–43. 
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sufficiently acknowledge the possibility of positive externalities from the 
institutional choice of self-interested factions. 
Political institutions have an inherently “public” quality that makes it 
difficult for vested interests to capture the entire benefits of their favored 
institutional initiatives to the exclusion of other groups. Or, to put it 
differently, because political institutions tend to shape the outcome of 
multiple policies, it is difficult to configure them as pure private goods 
where parties can capture the entire social surplus.64 Thus, compared to 
normal legislation, which can often be tailored to provide very narrow 
benefits to a vested interest, institutions are less susceptible to outright 
exclusivity and rivalry—two of the hallmarks of traditional private goods.65 
But that does not necessarily imply that all groups and citizens will benefit 
equally from such institutions. On the contrary, some groups may benefit 
from institutional arrangements, but others may be left worse off. The 
existence of positive spillovers from an institutional arrangement to certain 
groups may be contingent; in other words, even if it harms one group 
today, it may benefit them in the future. But this latter kind of distributional 
logic is not just an attribute of political institutions, but applies to a whole 
other range of public goods as well. 
A typical illustration of a positive spillover from institutional choice 
can be gleaned from the contentious politics of federalism in the United 
States during the mid-twentieth century. Southern segregationists from the 
Jim Crow era might have pushed for an institutional regime of strong 
states’ rights with the goal of achieving very specific sectional objectives. 
Nonetheless, they could not subsequently exclude groups favoring gay 
marriage from taking advantage of the same institution a couple of decades 
later when they faced threats from a hostile national coalition.66 It does not 
 
64 Of course, whether all institutional forms may yield spillover benefits to some groups is 
questionable. One may be able to imagine a scenario where a faction may try to tailor an institutional 
arrangement such that it is particularistic enough that it will yield only very narrow benefits to which it 
may exclude other factions and citizens. For instance, it is plausible that a faction may favor 
asymmetric federalism, in which states that favor its policy objectives have broad policy autonomy, 
while the states that it dislikes are constrained by the national government. But this outcome is unlikely 
for a variety of reasons. First, due to the very constraints inherent in factional bargaining, such an 
asymmetric institutional arrangement is hardly ever going to be adopted. The factions that are 
disfavored will simply not agree to the bargain. Second, factions tend to select institutional forms they 
favor from preexisting institutional arrangements, or from slight alterations to those arrangements. 
65 For an introductory discussion of public goods and the elements of exclusivity and rivalry, see 
WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND 
EXTENSIONS 694–95 (11th ed. 2012). 
66 For instance, as commentators have noted, it was conservative interest groups that first tried to 
expand the conflict over gay marriage to the national level. Donald P. Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion 
as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s, 
1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 5 (2001). 
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matter that these two groups might not share complementary social or 
economic objectives because the constraints or flexibility afforded by the 
institutional arrangements could be exploited for both purposes. 
Yet another illustration of a positive externality associated with a 
regime of states’ rights comes from William Riker, who, in answer to the 
question of whether federalism in the United States was worth preserving, 
famously stated: “[I]f in the United States one approves of Southern white 
racists, then one should approve of American federalism.”67 But years later, 
Riker would recant, in a way. Describing his own ideological shift from a 
New Deal sympathizer in the 1950s to a small-government liberal in the 
1980s, he averred that the civil rights legislation of the 1960s had altered 
the political scene: “With the racial dimension of judgment . . . removed, it 
became possible . . . to value federalism unambiguously as a deterrent to 
statism . . . .”68 Riker’s change of heart suggests that institutions that served 
a morally questionable agenda for certain groups in one era might produce 
other socially beneficial goals in another. 
In any event, when factions seek to co-opt institutions for their benefit, 
the relevant dynamic is not the one conventionally feared by public choice 
theorists. Olson worried that interest groups often try to secure policy 
outcomes in a manner that provides them specific benefits at the expense of 
voters.69 But at the level of factional support for institutions, Olson’s 
insight could be turned on its head. In this picture, narrow factions push for 
institutions that create spillover benefits for other groups, but they have no 
mechanism to extract compensation from these free riders. Thus, the 
dynamic is instead characterized by passive and unorganized groups who 
benefit from the hard work and sweat of others, but have done little to 
contribute to the institutional choice in the first place. 
By extending the range of beneficiaries of a favored institutional 
regime, however, factions may unleash a new range of political forces that 
are vested in keeping the new regime in place. To be sure, there is no 
mechanism for ensuring that such a self-reinforcing dynamic will persist; 
indeed, the new institutional move may fizzle out because of lack of broad 
support, or it may trigger a backlash that mobilizes opposition seeking to 
undo it. But in many contexts, there are reasons to suppose that institutions 
once created have a tendency to be relatively durable because changing 
them will generate significant transition costs. 
 
67 WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).  
68 WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, at xiii (1987). 
69 OLSON, supra note 4, at 111–31, 144. 
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1. An Illustration: Trade Reform in 1934.—The passage of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 is a classic illustration 
of how spillover benefits can be gained from institutional change favored 
by self-interested factions.70 The major institutional changes commonly 
associated with the RTAA include: delegating trade authority from 
Congress to the President; shifting from the supermajority requirement of 
the treaty clause to the congressional executive agreements; adopting most 
favored nations’ requirements in multilateral trade agreements; 
implementing reciprocal reduction of tariffs; and linking together foreign 
tariff negotiations with domestic tariff reductions in a single piece of 
legislation with an up-or-down vote.71 Together, these innovations have 
been credited with ushering in an era of liberalization the likes of which 
had not been known in American commercial history.72 
But within the Democratic Party, the Southern interests that 
championed trade reform were likely less motivated by the ideology of free 
markets than by a desire to secure access to foreign markets for cotton and 
tobacco. As exporters of primary agricultural products to Europe, Southern 
farmers often found themselves at loggerheads with protectionist industries 
concentrated in the Northeast.73 These latter interests had helped place 
Republicans in the White House in twelve of the sixteen presidential 
elections between the end of the Civil War and the onset of the New Deal. 
During this period of Republican hegemony, Southern interests and other 
export-oriented groups were largely thwarted in their efforts to secure low 
tariffs.74 With an ally in the White House in 1934, and majorities in both 
houses of Congress, the Democratic commercial coalitions set about trying 
to reshape the future institutional landscape of trade policy in their favor. 
 
70 In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), Pub. L. No. 73-316, 
§ 350(a), 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (2012)). The RTAA 
authorized the President “[t]o enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments . . . and . . . 
[t]o proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions . . . to carry out any 
[such] trade agreement.” 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
71 See § 1351(a). For a broad analysis of these innovations, see Michael A. Bailey et al., The 
Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WORLD 
POL. 309, 311, 336–37 (1997). 
72 KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEW LOOK AT US INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 40–43, 73–74 (2001); DESTLER, supra note 55, at 205–06; IRWIN, supra 
note 55, at 220–22.  
73 RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 
1877–1900, at 125–28 (2000). 
74 During the interwar years, the passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act (1930) and the Fordney–
McCumber Tariff Act (1922) ushered in a new era of aggressive protectionism by Republican-leaning 
groups; indeed, Smoot–Hawley was largely credited with spawning a wave of tariff wars around the 
world. See MICHAEL J. HISCOX, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & POLITICAL CONFLICT: COMMERCE, 
COALITIONS, AND MOBILITY 60–61 (2002).  
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The institutional reforms favored by these Democratic coalitions had 
welfare and distributional consequences for both agrarian and industrial 
groups, as well as consumers. The reforms improved the economic fortunes 
of Southern agrarian interests, like tobacco and cotton, while also helping 
specific industries that were export-oriented, such as aircraft, cameras, and 
automobiles.75 The reforms made certain commercial groups worse off, 
however, such as heavily protected industries like mining, toymakers, 
textile producers, and scientific instrument manufacturers.76 But a key 
spillover beneficiary of the reform was the unorganized consumer, who 
gained from the lower prices on imported products.77 Ironically, however, 
although economists almost uniformly agree about the social benefits of 
free trade, the verdict in popular surveys is less sanguine.78 Thus, it is hard 
to argue that the voting public demanded this state of affairs; on the 
contrary, it might be better to describe this as a form of institutional 
altruism that a faction imposed upon the public. 
But a more interesting dynamic turns on the subsequent downstream 
beneficiaries of the RTAA, especially those whom the proponents of the 
reform did not intend to target. Initially, the reform was politically fragile 
and might have been reversed if the political circumstances had favored the 
Republicans in the early years following reform. For instance, the 
Republican Party platform of 1936 not only vowed to repeal the RTAA,79 it 
also “condemn[ed] the secret negotiations of reciprocal trade treaties 
without public hearing or legislative approval.”80 For years prior to the 
1940 election, the Republican leaders in the House and Senate 
overwhelmingly voted for repeal of the RTAA every time it came up for 
renewal.81 By the late 1940s, however, when some of the Republican 
business constituencies that initially supported repeal eventually became 
 
75 Karen E. Schnietz, The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act, 57 INT’L ORG. 213, 222, 227–28 (2003).  
76 See id. at 218. 
77 Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 10–11 
(2009). 
78 IRWIN, supra note 55, at 1 (“[F]ree trade does not win many popularity contests. Indeed, public 
opinion surveys in the United States and Europe reveal increasing skepticism about the benefits of 
international trade and trade agreements.”). 
79 See Republican Party Platform of 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (2015), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29639#ixzz1RR7G6ga4 [http://perma.cc/PBZ6-LJ
A6] (“We will repeal the present Reciprocal Trade Agreement Law. It is futile and dangerous. Its effect 
on agriculture and industry has been destructive. Its continuation would work to the detriment of the 
wage earner and the farmer.”). 
80 See id.  
81 See Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing 
Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 643, 644–45 (1999). 
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net exporters, a split emerged among Republican legislators and many 
decamped from their long-held protectionist positions to embrace free 
trade.82 This intracoalitional split within the Republican Party made it more 
likely that the constitutional innovations that made the RTAA possible 
would remain durable. 
But buried in these developments lurks a political puzzle. It is 
standard fare in discussions about international trade policy to assert that 
protectionists have a clear advantage in overcoming collective action 
problems because the benefits to such groups are concentrated, whereas the 
costs to free trade groups are diffuse.83 In this picture, however, there are 
export-oriented constituencies demanding that politicians seek free trade 
policies, and these politicians responded by conveying concentrated 
benefits on these groups. These concentrated benefits turned out not to be a 
deadweight loss to society, but were actually socially efficient. 
Additionally, it is not quite correct to suggest that groups favoring free 
trade suffered from collective action problems at the time of the passage of 
the RTAA. The pro-free trade Southern National Farmers Alliance was 
considered “the largest citizen organization of nineteenth century 
America.”84 While this sector was not necessarily small in number, its 
geographical concentration was high, and there is evidence that the benefits 
from organizing were significant. Indeed, the political prowess of this 
group and its offshoots were noteworthy, and it was credited for partially 
spearheading the campaign to constitutionalize the income tax through the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which had largely anti-tariff implications.85 
Southern, pro-free trade interests also played an outsized role in 
influencing the political platforms of the national and state Democratic 
Parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They also were 
instrumental in securing the nomination of anti-tariff Democratic 
presidential candidates, including Presidents Grover Cleveland and 
 
82 See id. at 647 (“Senate Republicans voting in 1934 were responsive only to import-competing 
interests, whereas those voting in 1945 were responsive to both import-competing and export-oriented 
interests.”).  
83 Indeed, the notion that protectionist groups enjoy a special advantage in capturing the 
policymaking process is often put forth as a justification for the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization. See Dongsheng Zang, Divided by Common Language: ‘Capture’ Theories in GATT/WTO 
and the Communicative Impasse, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 424–27 (2009). For other 
commentary on the capture theory, see DESTLER, supra note 55, at 14, which discusses how 
protectionist interest groups capture Congress, and Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic 
Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 182 (2007), which 
states: “This cognitive factor tends to reinforce a protectionist proclivity in trade politics because it is 
usually those well-organized interest groups that regularly patronize and thus capture politicians.” 
84 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS 710 (David J. Wishart ed., 2004). 
85 See Kimberly J. Morgan & Monica Prasad, The Origins of Tax Systems: A French–American 
Comparison, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1350, 1362 (2009). 
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Woodrow Wilson.86 Indeed, President Cleveland’s first administration, 
with its strong free trade platform, coincided with the return to dominance 
of the Southern wing of the Democratic Party.87 By contrast, when 
Northern Democrats controlled the party from the Civil War through 
Reconstruction, they were much more ambivalent and divided on the tariff 
issue.88 
Other explanations of the RTAA that rely on the preferences of 
individual institutional actors are unsatisfactory. Take, for instance, the oft-
repeated claim that by delegating authority to the President, Congress 
empowered an actor whose preferences were more free-trade-leaning than 
that of Congress.89 Setting aside the questions about the problematic 
motivational and normative logic underpinning this argument,90 it also 
depicts a historically inaccurate picture. The delegation of trade authority to 
the President in 1934 was actually not particularly novel; on the contrary, it 
was largely imitating an institutional innovation established by Republican 
protectionist groups in the late nineteenth century.91 And prior to the 
RTAA, people largely did not view delegation as a pro-liberalization 
measure by free trade coalitions. For the most part, free trade Democrats 
during that era tended to denounce delegation as an unconstitutional ploy 
by protectionist Republicans.92 Once the shoe was on the other foot, 
 
86 See Kevin Narizny, Rational Idealism: The Political Economy of Internationalism in the United 
States and Great Britain, 1870–1945, SECURITY STUD., Spring 2003, at 1, 9 (discussing the role 
Southern Democrats played in Wilson’s electoral victory).  
87 BENSEL, supra note 73, at 474 n.33.  
88 See id. at 125 (“[I]n the industrial states of the East, the Democrats were much more restrained in 
their opposition to the tariff; many of them even embraced protection.”). As a result of the compromise 
of 1876, the Democratic Party had once again become a dominant political force in the South, and thus 
began the southernization of the Democratic Party. 
89 See DESTLER, supra note 55, at 15 (describing delegation to the President as an effort for 
Congress to overcome one sided pressure of protectionist groups); Bailey et al., supra note 71, at 327 
(observing that presidents favored low tariffs because the President’s constituency is national while that 
of a member of Congress is local); Schnietz, supra note 55, at 429, 432 (same); see also David A. Lake, 
The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-Hegemonic Era, 42 INT’L ORG. 33, 38 (1988) 
(“[W]here the representative element of the state can be best understood as acting in the interests of 
society, to use Pareto’s famous distinction, the executive acts in the interests for society.”). 
90 See Bailey et al., supra note 71, at 313–14 (criticizing the lessons-learned approach); David H. 
Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014) (criticizing the empirical and normative 
claims made in favor of presidential primacy in foreign affairs); Nzelibe, supra note 11, at 1226–31 
(same). 
91 See Jide Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free Trade Constitution (2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (describing the use of delegation by Republicans in the nineteenth century to 
achieve protectionist goals). 
92 One of those critical Democrats was the young anti-tariff Representative Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.), 
who, as Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, would embrace delegation as a device for rolling back 
protectionism. See The Tariff Commission and the Flexible Tariff, in 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, 
at 399 (1929), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre
1929052900#.Ujy4aZzCa3o [http://perma.cc/KF7G-LREU]. For Cordell Hull’s more optimistic view of 
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however, and the presidential electoral fortunes of the Democrats started to 
change in the 1930s, they discovered the wisdom of delegation. 
Republicans, on the other hand, had a change of heart in the opposite 
direction.93 
The notion that the President is predisposed to free trade is empirically 
suspect. On the contrary, it is more plausible to think that presidential 
preferences on trade policy are largely shaped by conflict among partisan 
coalitions. Historically, some of those coalitions have sought to delegate 
authority because they favored lower tariffs, and sometimes they have 
sought to delegate because they did not.94 
In the end, the forces that drove trade reform under the RTAA were 
not institutional actors operating autonomously or in opposition to special 
interest groups. On the contrary, much of the credit for reform should be 
given to the efforts of export-oriented groups of the 1930s, especially 
Southern farmers. But these pro-reform coalitions were not likely 
motivated by a high-minded desire to advance the general welfare. Their 
intended objectives were much more mundane: they were seeking to 
dismantle the system of tariffs that hurt their access to profitable markets in 
Europe. But by pursuing their own private interests, they were able to 
advance institutional arrangements that lowered tariffs domestically and 
thus benefited the welfare of consumers in the United States. 
C. Factions May Safeguard Against the Concentration of Authority 
In much of the contemporary discourse about factions, there is an 
implicit assumption that if one purges the influence of special interest 
groups from the political scene, public officials will be able to diligently 
pursue publicly minded objectives. But this logic of attaining political 
benevolence by subtraction contains many problems. First, a politician who 
listens exclusively to voters might not necessarily be motivated to do what 
is in the “public interest” because voters might not necessarily be benignly 
 
delegation when he was Secretary of State, see Judith H. Bello, Rising Tides: The Many-Faceted 
Benefits of Global Trade Liberalization, 93 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 86, 87–88 (1999).  
93 See Republican Party Platform of 1936, supra note 79. 
94 To be clear, delegation to the President in the modern era may be more consistent with free trade 
objectives. But that may be largely an artifact of the reality that modern presidents are prohibited by the 
post-RTAA multilateral trade regime from raising tariffs unilaterally, although they have leeway to 
reduce tariffs. This would be consistent with contemporary observations that the pro-free trade party 
tends to favor delegation (regardless of the President), while the protectionist party tends to oppose 
delegation (regardless of the President). See Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky & Phillip Y. Lipscy, Congressional 
Preferences and the Structure of Delegation: Reassessing the Effect of Divided Government on U.S. 
Trade Policy 4 (May 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1893289 [http://perma.cc/RAS3-KT5B]). 
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motivated.95 Setting aside the concerns of majority tyranny, the voters 
might not necessarily be inclined to engage in disinterested judgments of 
what the best policy might be, and more importantly, they might not be 
motivated to have their representatives do so either. 
Second, aside from voters and factions, there is also the problem that 
the office holders themselves behave in self-interested ways that may 
threaten institutional stability. One significant risk is that as suppliers of 
public policies who also seek to extend their tenures on power, politicians 
across the different branches of government might actually seek to pursue 
power as an end in itself.96 In addition, some politicians may be tempted to 
collude with each other, thus denying the voters any of the supposed 
benefits of institutional competition that inhere in a system of checks and 
balances.97 While institutional self-aggrandizement by certain office 
holders, such as the President, need not always result in bad policy 
outcomes, it could lead to greater policy volatility across electoral cycles 
and to an increase in the level of maximalist policies, which in turn may 
increase political instability. 
Factions, on the other hand, are more likely to act as policy 
maximizers who tend to view political power largely as a means for 
achieving other ideological or material objectives. The implication of this 
dynamic is that factions may sometimes oppose the centralization or 
accretion of power if they think it is likely to result in policy goals they 
disfavor, regardless of which party happens to be in power. Therefore, 
factions can play a role in overcoming collusion by forcing adversity across 
institutional boundaries, even when officeholders might otherwise prefer 
not to be in conflict. In this scenario, if members of Congress seek to 
collude to enhance the power of a sitting president, they might find 
 
95 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 191 (3d ed. 1950); see 
also ANTHONY MCGANN, THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY: RECONCILING EQUALITY, DELIBERATION, AND 
MINORITY PROTECTION 79 (2006) (“For democracy to have epistemic value, votes have to represent 
considered judgments of what the correct policy is. However, political philosophers do not get to tell 
voters how to use their votes.”).  
96 As John C. Calhoun writes: “The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the 
government, and thereby of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other 
considerations, ample to divide . . . a community into two great hostile parties.” JOHN C. CALHOUN, A 
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND SELECTIONS FROM THE DISCOURSE 14–15 (1953).  
97 Indeed, one of the leading theoretical defenses of the separations of powers builds on the key 
assumption that the various branches will not engage in collusion. Torsten Persson et al., Separation of 
Powers and Political Accountability, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1163 (1997). But collusion between the political 
branches is, of course, relatively common in American constitutional law. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (declaring unconstitutional legislation that provided the 
President with line item veto power); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to 
Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2231–32 (2012) (“Separation of powers controversies and 
litigation most often involve collusion—agreement between putative institutional rivals in order to take 
some constitutionally controversial government action.”).  
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themselves facing the wrath of a policy-motivated faction whose interests 
might not be advanced by such collusion. 
Take, for instance, the perennial debates in the literature about war 
powers. A prevailing concern in the American constitutional system is that 
during periods of united government, Congress does not tend to check the 
President in national security, and thus there is a greater risk that the 
President will embark on military engagements without sufficient popular 
support. Pildes and Levinson have argued, for instance, that judicial review 
is most valuable during periods of united government where congressional 
checks on presidential initiatives are weakest.98 While their prescription 
builds on an acceptable empirical generalization about American politics,99 
it is nonetheless incomplete. Sometimes, factions may decide to deploy 
institutions strategically to constrain presidential flexibility when an issue 
is owned by the political opposition, and increase flexibility on their own 
issues, regardless of which coalition occupies the White House.100 
Two examples illustrate how, due to factional pressures, members of 
Congress opposed expansive war powers even during the presidency of a 
copartisan, or encouraged more expansive war powers on behalf of the 
President because of pressure from the political opposition. 
1. Conservative Opposition to Presidential Dominance in War 
Powers: 1947–1960.—President Truman’s Cold War rearmament 
policies and his decision to commit significant resources to defend South 
Korea alarmed conservative-leaning groups during the early postwar era.101 
 
98 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2367–68 (2006). 
99 See William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 
59 INT’L ORG. 209, 215 (2005) (“If they take any public stand or introduce any substantive legislation, 
copartisans in Congress are likely to demonstrate solidarity with their president, authorizing the use of 
force or appropriating the funds needed to carry it out.”).  
100 The analysis here builds on the “issue ownership” theory of partisan competition in which 
parties try to shape the relevant issue agenda in a political contest in a way that favors those issues in 
which they have an electoral advantage. As one prominent political scientist observed, “[P]arties do not 
debate positions on a single issue, but try instead to make end runs around each other on different 
issues.” William H. Riker, Introduction to AGENDA FORMATION 1, 4 (William H. Riker ed., 1993). 
According to this framework, parties cultivate issue-specific reputations and are thus perceived by 
voters as being more competent at resolving certain policy problems. For the most part, parties tend to 
own those issues in which the electorate believes they have a special expertise. In the United States, for 
instance, Democrats have cultivated a better reputation for handling social welfare and health issues, 
whereas Republicans seem to have an electoral advantage in national security, drugs, and crime. As 
such, each party has an incentive to focus their campaigns on those issues in which they are perceived 
to have a leg up on the opposition. See John R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presidential 
Campaigning, 1952–2000, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 601–02 (2003). 
101 Truman’s Cold War strategy was encapsulated in the National Security Act of 1947, an 
elaborate piece of legislation that was dubbed by a prominent Cold War historian “the Magna Carta of 
the national security state.” MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1945–1954, at 24 (1998).  
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These conservative constituencies feared that unrestrained defense 
spending would lead to higher inflation, economic controls, and other fiscal 
policies that could harm their interests.102 Soon enough, disagreements over 
policy spilled over into disputes about the constitutional allocation of 
authority. That controversy came to a head in the aftermath of the Korean 
War, when conservatives roundly criticized Truman for embarking on the 
conflict without proper congressional authorization.103 But Democratic-
leaning constituencies were more sympathetic to the vision of a President 
with more flexible authority and a greater assertive role in foreign affairs.104 
In addition, there were intense disagreements over how the burden of 
rearmament and war mobilization ought to be allocated, with conservative 
constituencies sharply criticizing the huge tax burdens triggered by the 
Korean War.105 
These disagreements had a much larger political dimension as well. 
Specifically, conservative-leaning factions tended to depict Truman’s 
vision of a national security state as complementary to an activist welfare 
state, in which the occasion of mobilizing for war would be used to 
consolidate the gains of the New Deal.106 The possible symbiotic 
relationship between the politics of guns and butter was not lost on Truman 
or on Democratic-leaning constituencies, who actively promoted it.107 
But the conservative antipathy to growing presidential power in 
national security during the postwar era was not simply a case of partisan 
aversion by Republicans to Truman’s presidency. On the contrary, 
conservative resistance to the expansion of presidential foreign affairs 
powers persisted throughout the 1950s, even after the Republicans won the 
White House in 1953. Sometimes, their strategies for foiling the growth of 
presidential authority included proposals for formal constitutional change, 
such as the aborted Bricker Amendment of 1952–1953, which attempted to 
weaken the President’s treaty powers.108 Congress voted on this proposal, 
which Republican senators overwhelmingly supported, during 
Eisenhower’s presidency. Although Eisenhower expressed sympathy with 
 
102 See id. at 9–10. 
103 See Jide Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 874–75 
(2013).  
104 See HOGAN, supra note 101, at 5, 350–51.  
105 See id. at 6. 
106 Id. at 290–91. 
107 See id. at 350–51. 
108 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988) (describing the Bricker Amendment controversy). For a 
broader discussion of the debates surrounding the Bricker Amendment movement, see Nzelibe, supra 
note 20. 
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his copartisans about the dangers of using the treaty power to deal with 
domestic issues, he sought to avoid the political pressure for an amendment 
by committing not to sign any human rights treaty while he was in 
power.109 
Sometimes, the strategies deployed by conservative groups were more 
nuanced, such as trying to roll back the notion (endorsed by Truman) that 
the President could act unilaterally in foreign affairs. Eisenhower often 
obliged the more conservative wing of the Republican Party by distancing 
himself from the constitutional and political vision of his predecessor.110 
Facing pressures from his conservative flank to reduce taxes and defense 
spending, for instance, Eisenhower slashed the defense budget, but several 
members of Congress swiftly condemned him for endangering national 
security.111 When the question arose as to whether the United States would 
intervene on France’s behalf in Indochina in 1954, Eisenhower reassured 
reporters, “[T]here is going to be no involvement of America in war unless 
it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to 
declare it.”112 
While the pressures of the Cold War might have led to both a more 
assertive role for President Eisenhower in foreign affairs and a more 
acquiescent Congress, neither occurred. One cannot attribute reluctance on 
Eisenhower’s part to popular sentiment. On the contrary, as Samuel 
Huntington has shown elsewhere, popular public opinion during the 
decades after the end of World War II tended to favor a more assertive role 
of the American military and an increase in military expenditures.113 One 
might argue that Eisenhower’s experience as a former military officer 
 
109 Secretary of State Dulles stated during congressional hearings: 
[W]hile we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on 
human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as 
the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to 
which this Nation has been dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to become a 
party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate. 
Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953). 
110 See DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle 
East, January 5, 1957, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER 1957, at 6, 11 (1958). (“Only with [congressional] cooperation can we give the 
reassurance needed to deter aggression . . . .”); see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 116 
(3d ed., rev. 2013) (“Eisenhower . . . came to realize it was a serious mistake, politically and 
constitutionally, to commit the nation to war in Korea without congressional approval.”).  
111 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL 
POLITICS 234–43 (1961).  
112 FISHER, supra note 110, at 104 (quoting DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, The President’s News 
Conference of March 10, 1954, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1954, at 299, 306 (1960)). 
113 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 111, at 236–43.  
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cautioned against a more aggressive military role. That might be plausible, 
except that the top military brass in his administration actually favored 
increased defense expenditures,114 and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
favored military intervention in Vietnam in 1954.115 However, a more 
plausible explanation is that a strong countervailing current of special 
interests within his party stood to lose if a more dominant and intrusive 
military role was asserted. At bottom, those factions promoted more active 
constraints on presidential war powers during the height of the Cold War. 
In sum, conservative factions in the post-World War II era tended to 
associate greater presidential power with the threat of a creeping statism 
that would be harmful to their core constituencies, regardless of the 
occupant of the White House. 
2. Liberal Opposition to Repealing the War Powers Resolution: 
1994–1997.—Starting with the fallout of the Vietnam War, the 
politics of guns and butter took a sharp turn. Progressive Democrats 
eventually abandoned their longstanding legacy from the 1950s as the war 
party, and started to welcome greater congressional constraints on war 
powers. When the Reagan Administration embraced fiscal policies that 
made the tradeoff between guns and butter explicit, Republicans cemented 
their modern reputation as the war party.116 For many conservatives in the 
post-Vietnam era, one particular institutional prize loomed large: repealing 
the War Powers Resolution (WPR). Passed in 1973 over President Nixon’s 
veto, the WPR provides certain procedures that the President has to comply 
with before he introduces forces into foreign hostilities.117 The WPR has 
since been criticized by a variety of politicians for hampering the 
President’s war making powers.118 
 
114 HOGAN, supra note 101, at 387–92.  
115 JOHN P. BURKE & FRED I. GREENSTEIN, HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY: DECISIONS ON 
VIETNAM, 1954 AND 1965, at 48–49 (1989). 
116 Here, the assumption is that a state can invest heavily in either “guns” (i.e., defense), “butter” 
(i.e., production of other social goods), or a combination of both. During the early portion of the New 
Deal, investments in guns were considered complimentary to investments in butter, whereas after the 
Vietnam War they became increasingly viewed as substitutes. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR 
BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 535–37 (1996); Benjamin O. Fordham, The Evolution 
of Republican and Democratic Positions on Cold War Military Spending: A Historical Puzzle, 31 SOC. 
SCI. HIST. 603 (2007) (describing the Republican position as the war party); Nzelibe, supra note 103, at 
870–71 (describing the Left’s guns and butter tradeoff). 
117 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555–56 (1973). 
118 For instance, Bob Dole introduced a bill called the Peace Powers Act of 1995, which in his 
words would “untie the [P]resident’s hands in using American forces to defend American interests.” 
Robert J. Dole, ‘We Will Continue in Our Drive to Return Power to Our States and Our People,’ 
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A10. 
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During the Clinton Presidency, hawkish coalitions within the 
Republican Party gambled on a “Nixon goes to China” logic;119 in other 
words, they calculated that their best opportunity to scrap the WPR was 
when a Democrat was in the White House. The legislative vehicle for 
repeal was a 1995 bill by Congressman Henry Hyde, an Illinois 
Republican. In a speech on the House floor in support of Hyde’s bill, 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich invoked the spirit of bipartisanship:  
I rise for what some Members might find an unusual moment, an appeal to the 
House to, at least on paper, increase the power of President Clinton. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . . [T]he American nation needs to understand that as Speaker of the House 
and as the chief spokesman in the House for the Republican party, I want to 
strengthen the current Democratic president because he is the President of the 
United States.120  
If he intended this appeal for his colleagues in the Democratic Party, it fell 
on deaf ears. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) asked his colleagues to 
repudiate the invitation because it “sends a signal that we abdicate our 
power and give it to the President carte blanche.”121 In a lopsided decision, 
House Democrats voted 172–23 against the Amendment that would 
ostensibly have increased the powers of their copartisan in the White 
House.122 
D. Some Cautionary Notes About the Benefits of Faction 
The analysis above has largely bracketed any discussion of the dark 
side of factions in institutional design, and has instead focused on the sunny 
side because such a perspective has been largely overlooked in the public 
law literature. Such an approach is admittedly partial, but the goal here is to 
provide a counterweight to the conventional hostility to factions rather than 
engage in any comprehensive analysis. 
Nonetheless, one might argue that the illustrations above have 
depicted an overly benign picture of the influence of factions in shaping 
 
119 As Robert Goodin has argued elsewhere in explaining the logic of the “Nixon goes to China” 
effect, “If an action is somehow out of character for a particular politician, then, for that reason there are 
fewer external obstacles to that politician’s performing it.” Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the 
Looking Glass, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 420, 421 (1983). In this case, Newt Gingrich’s position would 
have been likely criticized harshly as being overly partisan if he was seeking to expand the war powers 
of a co-Republican in the White House. But such criticism would seem misplaced when he was pushing 
to expand the presidential powers of a Democrat. 
120 141 CONG. REC. H5672–73 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gingrich).  
121 Katharine Q. Seelye, House Defeats Bid to Repeal ‘War Powers,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at 
A11. 
122 See id. 
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institutions. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the net effect of this 
influence is always going to be positive; on the contrary, tradeoffs are 
involved. The level of enthusiasm associated with factions depends on 
whether one thinks the expected benefits from institutional energy 
outweigh the risks of having institutions that may be partially skewed in 
favor of the most dominant factions. Indeed, even with some of the 
illustrations above, one could plausibly argue that the role of factions might 
have sometimes gone too far in one direction. Take, for instance, the 
account given of the role of factions in opposing the expansion of 
presidential war powers during the twentieth century. One could contend 
that such opposition occasionally compromised the ability of the President 
to react to both pressing security threats and humanitarian crisis or to 
resolve an ongoing crisis in the most effective manner.123 Whether one 
thinks that state of affairs is good or bad may depend on one’s view of the 
optimal balance between policy flexibility and constraints in national 
security. But this paper does not purport to evaluate that balance. It merely 
suggests that if one thinks constraining presidential flexibility in war 
powers is sometimes important, one has to factor in the potentially positive 
role of policy-seeking factions, and not simply rely on the empire building 
ambitions of other institutional actors, such as members of Congress. 
Finally, because promoting certain institutional values and certain 
factional goals are not mutually exclusive endeavors, one ought to be more 
circumspect about drawing sharp distinctions between factions that may 
produce good institutional outcomes and those that do not. Take, for 
instance, the distribution of factions that favored and opposed the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934. It might be that the Republican 
protectionist groups who opposed reform and helped unleash the Smoot–
Hawley tariffs in the early part of the 1930s were in one sense 
counterproductive, especially from the perspective of good trade policy. 
But the same protectionist groups that dominated the American political 
landscape for most of the early-to-mid twentieth century have sometimes 
favored institutions that created significant spillover benefits for other 
groups. For instance, for reasons that overlap with their pro-tariff leanings, 
protectionist groups from the Northeast embraced institutional reform in 
the mid-nineteenth century that most reasonable people would consider to 
 
123 In his memoirs, for instance, Secretary of State Acheson not only argued that Truman’s actions 
in Korea were constitutional, he also suggested that it was politically prudent for Truman to have 
avoided a congressional resolution because the arduous process of doing so could have “shaken [the] 
morale of the troops.” DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS AT THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT 415 (1969). Moreover, he rebuffed the view that a congressional resolution would have 
softened political criticism if the war became unpopular; after all, he insisted, “Congressional approval 
did not soften or divert the antiwar critics of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt.” Id. 
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be benign: the abolition of slavery.124 As Rogowski observed, the 
abolitionist support for protectionism was born of simple economic logic: 
“Expanding trade, in the labor-scarce Americas, could only have depressed 
wages; and such a development would in turn have intensified and 
prolonged slavery.”125 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has attempted to defend the role of powerful factions in 
both the design and maintenance of institutions in international and 
constitutional law. 
As long as groups have different capacities to mobilize politically, 
those with superior political resources are likely to have an upper hand in 
shaping the political rules of the game. But the role of special interest 
politics in institutional design need not be pathological. On the contrary, 
the prospect of private benefits going to certain groups may help spur them 
to create institutions that also benefit unorganized interests. Of course, this 
argument only suggests that a certain amount of factional self-interest in 
institutional design is desirable. It also recognizes that the role of self-
interest and power may sometimes be excessive. On balance, the net 
benefits of self-interested institutional design hinge on whether it is 
difficult for factions to extract the entire social surplus from their preferred 
political institutions to the exclusion of other groups. 
But if contemporary political institutions exhibit a considerable degree 
of nonexcludability and nonrivalry, then unorganized groups may gain 
from those institutions even when they have contributed little to either 
establishing or maintaining them. It is perhaps too strong to suggest that all 
political institutions favored by narrow factions will yield spillover benefits 
that exceed their social costs. But one may find some solace in the 
likelihood that deeply asymmetric institutions tend not to have much 
political staying power in the United States political system. While there 
are understandably impulses to push the growth of the American state or 
the executive branch in one direction, there are always counteracting forces 
 
124 Indeed, some have suggested that protectionism was the key reason why certain groups opposed 
slavery. See, e.g., Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of 
Free Trade and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 181, 222 (1996) (“The 
United States has worked to end this practice throughout the world since shortly after its own slavery 
trade was abolished, though probably more for protectionist purposes than to accomplish any strong 
moral cause.”). That perspective seems somewhat extreme. It is probably more likely that the goals of 
seeking higher tariffs by northern industrialists happened to be complementary to the objective of 
ending slavery.  
125 RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: HOW TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS 166–67 (1989) (footnote omitted).  
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who believe that bolstering a more powerful Congress or diffusing power 
to the states will serve their interests. Ultimately, any political institution 
that has significant redistributive consequences is prone to sustained attack 
from those groups it disadvantages, and might eventually crumble or 
become significantly revised either after multiple electoral cycles or when 
new oppositional forces are mobilized. 
At its core, however, the approach to institutional design endorsed 
here is obviously nonideal. As a model of political behavior, it is one that is 
marked by the dynamics of compromise and side-payments, the self-
serving strategies and motives of transient interest groups, and sheer 
political opportunism. Moreover, while it may inhibit the kinds of 
maximalist policies that are favored by any one faction, it does not 
guarantee that the political actors will gravitate towards the optimal set of 
policies from a welfare perspective. At best, it may provide incentives for 
politicians to avoid bad policies, and more often than not it may induce 
them toward outcomes that may seem positively unexceptional. 
Thus, unlike the bees in Bernard Mandeville’s famous fable or the 
market in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,126 the “invisible hand” in a 
model of self-interested institutional design may not necessarily point in 
the direction of greater efficiency. Instead, it veers towards an objective 
that is perhaps less rhetorically appealing but no less praiseworthy: 
moderate institutional stability under a government bound by constraints. 
  
 
126 See, e.g., BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES 67 (Phillip Harth ed., Penguin 
Books 1970) (1724) (“Thus every Part was full of Vice, / Yet the whole Mass a Paradice.”); ADAM 
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 130 (Laurence 
Dickey ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. abridged ed. 1993) (1776) (“[H]e intends only his own gain, and 
he is . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends 
to promote it.”). 
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